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1. Introduction  
Although a fully articulated, general theory of the affect institutional incentives 
have on individuals and their behavior in collective-action situations has not been 
developed, there is growing consensus among those social and political scientists 
focused on social dilemmas that the conventional economic theory of externalities is a 
special case of a more general theoretical structure (Ostrom, 2007; Frohlich & 
Oppenheimer, 2001). 
Clearly, the essence of social dilemmas, such as the appropriation of a common-
pool resource or the provision of a public good, is inseparable from the existence of 
market externalities and the inherent payoff structure. These dilemmas often embroil an 
individual in a decision situation where his interests and the group’s interests collide. 
Without questioning the generalisability of the economic postulate of rationality, 
conventional theory considers that the individual facing this type of conflict is trapped 
in the “inherent logic” of the situation (Hardin, 1968). Accordingly, these individuals 
are said to be facing a “social dilemma:” they would all be better off if they found a way 
to cooperate, but there is no incentive for the individual to bear the costs of cooperation 
(Ostrom, 2007).
1 As a result, conventional theory repeatedly advocates that institutions 
designed to prevent the “tragedy of the commons” should first address the fundamental 
problem of property rights––whether public or private––and second be aware that 
regulations often must be imposed by external authorities acting in the public interest, 
assuming that these authorities can devise the proper institutions (Ostrom, 2007). 
                                                 
1 Basically, a rule to cooperate to solve the dilemma has the character of a public good: the entire 
community benefits from that rule, whether they contribute for its provision or not. Under the assumption 
of self-interest, this rule creates a second-level, same-type dilemma on-top of the initial dilemma, which 
is inconsistent with the conventional theory that the same “helpless” participants, trapped by the inherent 
logic of the commons, solve a second-level dilemma in order to address the first-level dilemma. 
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Scholars have learned that problems of overharvesting and the misuse of 
ecological systems are rarely due to a single cause (Ostrom, 2005). Field and laboratory 
research focused on social dilemmas have shown that individuals’ behaviors in these 
situations are affected not only by the structural characteristics of the outcomes but also 
by the structural characteristics of the group (size, leadership, inter-communication), 
and the specific content or context of the dilemma (investments, social events, 
environmental issues) (Kollock, 1998; Komorita & Parks, 1995; Kopelman et al., 2002; 
Lepyard, 1995; Van Lange, Liebrand, Messick, & Wilke, 1992; Ostrom, Gardner & 
Walker, 1994; Poppe, 2005). 
Much of the research about social dilemmas has been focused on the 
identification of sets of variables that act to mitigate social losses associated with 
conflicts between the individual and the collective in the face of externalities (Ostrom 
1990; Schlager 1994; McKean 1992, 2000; Tang 1994; Ostrom et al. 1994; Wade 1996; 
Baland & Platteau 1996; Agrawal 2001). The puzzle is that these structural and 
contextual variables also interact with the characteristics of the individuals involved, so 
that different individuals may respond differently to objectively similar incentive 
structures and contexts of action: different individuals often have different attitudes 
towards existing information, perceived uncertainly and risk, inter-communication, and 
authoritarian figures.  
The implications of an individual’s attributes are particularly important in social 
dilemma situations because of the essentially moral nature of the choices that must be 
made when individual and collective interests collide.
2 Due to the moral nature of many 
social dilemmas, the aprioristic notion that all preferences are self-centered, as the 
                                                 
2 As Heath (2007) indicates, while there are many aspects of morality that are puzzling, perhaps the most 
puzzling is that it often requires us to act in ways that are contrary to our self-interest. “We may find 
ourselves  wanting  something,  but  feeling  that morality  prohibits  us  from  doing  what is necessary  to 
obtain it. Morality therefore presents itself to us in the form of a duty to refrain from the pursuit of 
individual advantage, or to use the more technical term, in the form of a deontic constraint.”   3
standard theory postulates, does not provide adequate explanatory depth. By implicitly 
equating utility with profits and rationality with self-interest, one actually dismisses the 
need to understand how individuals reach utility judgments. While this might be a 
reasonably scholarly strategy for modeling behavior in highly competitive market 
settings, as Ostrom (2005) puts it, it is not so when addressing most social dilemmas. 
These situations often evoke the participants’ internal values, which may not be 
monotonically related to the objective payoff (ibid, Gintis, 2000; Camerer, 2003). 
Once it is recognized that intrinsic values matter when addressing morally 
relevant conflicts of action, one must then realize that the situation is one of incomplete 
information: one agent cannot know exactly how other agents are valuing alternative 
actions and outcomes (Ostrom, 2005). Finally, conventional risk analysis cannot 
adequately determine the effect of institutionally sponsored incentives on the successful 
resolution of a social dilemma, for how does one accurately discount individual 
morality, but must be expanded to include the application of discrete rules of thumb or 
heuristics (cf. Heiner, 1983).   
This is possibly why Ostrom (2005) suggests that the major theoretical challenge 
facing those studying today’s social dilemmas is the development of an appropriate 
family of assumptions regarding the intrinsic values individuals place on actions and 
outcomes––particularly outcomes obtained with others:  
“Without further progress in developing our theories and 
models of human valuation in social dilemma situations, those 
convinced that all human behavior can be explained using 
rational egoist models will continue to recommend Leviathan-
like remedies for overcoming all social dilemmas.” 
We suggest that the constructivist-structuralist conception of human 
development has led to theories and findings of great relevance to our understanding of   4
human valuation; and as this understanding improves, so does our ability to construct 
institutions that better resolve social dilemmas. A central tenet of developmental 
psychology is that to produce the expected results, the incentive structure should be 
tuned to the characteristics of each psychosocial centralization stage, as motivational 
needs, aims, and means differ between each stage. The substantive significance of a 
developmental framework to the resolution of social dilemmas is emphasized by the 
growing consensus among developmental psychologists that (i) psychological 
development is not upper-bounded, i.e., it is not limited to the childhood and 
adolescence, as traditionally assumed, and (ii) open-ended, multi-stream, complex 
interior growth is a process that involves a continuing decline in egocentrism, 
increasing autonomy and an increasing ability to take other people, places, and things 
into account when making decisions that affect the well-being of others (Wilber, 2000, 
2001; cf. also Commons, 1981, 2000). 
The broad study seeks to explain and predict behavior in collective action 
situations using alternative theories and models of adult development. This paper is 
rooted in the constructs of a selected developmental theory; one that is particularly 
suited to the examination of behavior in situations where individual and the collective 
interests collide.  
We began by assessing the psychosocial profiles of 322 Brazilians who were 
potential participants in three experiments: a laboratory common-pool resource 
appropriation dilemma, including communication and sanctioning conditions, a 
stepwise public-goods provision dilemma with variable levels of required contribution, 
and the standard Ultimatum game. We carried out factor analysis on data from the 
initial psychosocial survey of the experiments’ participants to pretest the cross-cultural 
robustness of the theoretical constructs set in the chosen developmental model. The   5
procedure resulted in three quite meaningful principal factors, which represented three 
principal psychosocial centralization stages present in our sample. The participants’ 
behaviors in the different experimental situations were then analyzed statistically to find 
out whether they conform with a set of theoretical expectations derived from Graves’s 
theory, as well as with the general features of human internal development (declining 
egocentrism, increasing autonomy, increasing awareness). Experimental results suggest 
that the theoretical constructs built in the chosen developmental model provide a 
reliable basis for predicting behavior in the situations we examined and that a greater 
willingness to cooperate is indeed associated with higher stages of psychosocial 
development. In this paper we summarize the results from the public-good game (PGG) 
experiment. Results from the common-pool resource (CPR) experiments can be found 
in Meyer and Braga (2009). The conjunct of all experimental results is reported in 
Meyer (2006). 
The following section briefly outlines Clare Graves’s “Emergent Cyclical Levels 
of Existence Theory” (Graves, 1970, 2005). The paper continues with a summarization 
of the methods and procedures used in this study. It then puts forward our hypotheses, 
presents and analyzes results from the experiments, and closes with our conclusions and 
a discussion of the study’s policy implications.  
 
2. The biopsychosocial waves of agency and communion, 
Graves’s theory postulates that the biopsychosocial development of human 
beings arises from the interaction of a double-helix complex of two sets of determining 
forces: environmental social determinants and the organism’s neuropsychological 
survival equipment. After about a decade of careful empirical research, Graves (1970) 
conceptualized eight emergent stages, or waves, of interior growth in adult humans.   6
These stages are states of biopsychosocial equilibrium, comprised of a perception of the 
environment and a reciprocal neurochemical balance, and are reflected in a social 
construction that then influences the mental equilibrium. In Graves’s words, 
 
“The psychology of the adult human being is an unfolding, 
ever-emergent process marked by subordination of older 
behavior systems to newer, higher order systems. The mature 
person tends to change his psychology continuously as the 
conditions of his existence change. Each successive stage or 
level of existence is a state through which people may pass on 
the way to other states of equilibrium. When a person is 
centralized in one of the states of equilibrium, he has a 
psychology which is particular to that state. His emotions, 
ethics and values, biochemistry, state of neurological 
activation, learning-systems, preference for education, 
management and psychotherapy are all appropriate to that 
state. If he were centralized in some other state, he would 
think, feel and be motivated in manners appropriate to that 
state. He would have biochemical characteristics and a state of 
neurological activation particular to it. When in a certain state, 
he would have opened only certain systems for coping and 
learning. Thus, he would respond most positively to education, 
management, and therapy which are congruent with that state. 
And he would have to respond negatively to forms of 
education, management and therapy not appropriate to the state 
of his centralization” (Graves 2005, p.29-30). 
 
Graves’s sweeping statement is subject to the currently accepted understanding 
that most of the multiple lines or streams of consciousness that comprise human 
interiority makeup decomposable subsystems that develop in a relatively independent   7
fashion (Wilber, 2001, p. 44). As a result, a person can be very advanced in some lines, 
medium in others, and low in others––all at the same time. Hence, it is not quite 
appropriate to talk about general “levels of existence” as no sequential development can 
possibly be devised when considering the sum total of all these different lines. 
However, as Wilber (2001) reports, “the bulk of research has continued to find that each 
developmental line itself tends to unfold in a sequential, holarchical fashion,” meaning 
(i) that higher stages in each line tend to build upon or incorporate the earlier stages of 
that line, (ii) that no stage can be skipped, and (iii) that the stages emerge in an order 
that cannot be altered by environmental conditioning or social reinforcement. 
With these caveats and core ideas in mind, the special significance of Graves’s 
theory to our understanding of the interplay among cognition, values, and institutions in 
collective-action settings is rooted in the very structure and focus of his model. The 
substance of Graves’s constructs resides on revealing the different sets of values 
individuals place on actions and outcomes affecting others’ well-being. Graves’s model 
puts forward the notion that people tend to oscillate between two fundamental stances, 
between “me” (agency) and “we” (communion) (Cowan & Todorovic, 2005). 
According to Graves’s model, this cyclical turn produces two basic behavioral systems, 
express-self systems and sacrifice-self systems (Table 1), which have manifest 
implications for the analysis of conflicts between individual and collective interests. 
The holarchical organization of Graves’s stages indicates that interior awakening 
brings about new, emergent capacities marked by broader perspectives, resulting in a 
sequence showing decreasing egocentrism and increasing behavioral freedom. Wilber 
(2000, 2001) indicated that these features express what is possibly the most convergent 
characteristic in the field of developmental psychology. The decrease in egocentrism is 
made evident in the progression from the 3
rd to 5
th to 7
th stages in Graves’s schema   8
(Table 1). It should be noted that the whole scheme implies a widening moral embrace, 
i.e., of those who are considered worthy of moral concern. Behavioral freedom and 
autonomy increase as new capacities are added along the developmental path. As 
suggested previously, stages of development are not rigid levels but flowing waves with 
much overlap and interweaving, a meshwork or dynamic spiral of unfolding 
consciousness (Wilber, 2001; Beck and Cowan, 1996). But still, convergent research 
findings indicate that stages of centralization can be defined as whole-part discrete 
totalities (holons), which bring about certain behavioral patterns representing the 
preferred ways of coping.  
Table 1. Cyclical aspect, way of thinking and themes of the selected Gravesian 








(communion)  Holistic  Adjust to the realities of one’s existence and accept the 




(agency)  Ecological 
Express self for what self desires, but never at the expenses 









(agency)  Strategic  Express self for what self desires, but in a fashion 








(agency)  Egocentric  Express self, to hell with others and the consequences, lest 








(agency)  Instinctive 
Express self as just another animal according to the 
dictates of one’s psychological needs and the 
environmental possibilities. 
Source: Author’s configuration based on Graves (2005) and Beck and Cowan (1996) 
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In spite of the subtleness and caveats of Graves’s concept, his model has evident 
implications in the analysis of social dilemmas. While specific behavioral hypotheses 
must wait until we have presented the experimental conditions, it is clear that we should 




th) or the 
express-self 7
th stage to have more cooperative dispositions than individuals centered in 
the express-self 1
st, 3
rd and the 5
th stages, which should be especially evident when 
individual and collective interest collide. 
 
3. Method 
To begin our test of the explanatory and predictive value of Graves’s constructs 
in regards to collective-action dilemmas, the psychosocial profiles of 322 potential 
Brazilian participants were assessed by means of a survey designed using an authorized 
translation of a tool developed by Hurlbut (1979), in collaboration with the National 
Value Center (NVC) Inc.. From the total number of respondents, 127 participants (62 
female and 65 male) actually took place in the public-goods provision dilemma 
experiment (PGG). 
3.1. Recruitment procedures and characteristics of the sample 
For the most part, the experiment participants were undergraduate and graduate 
students from various major programs at the Federal University of Viçosa (UFV). 
Forty-three percent were between 18 and 21 years old, 52% were between 22 and 29, 10 
people (3%) were in their thirties, 3 were in their forties, and one individual was in his 
fifties. Ninety-two percent were from the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais, 3% were from 
São Paulo, 2% were from Rio de Janeiro, and the remaining participants were from 
Bahia, Espirito Santo, Brasília (D.F), and Pará. Identification numbers were randomly 
distributed to each individual to preserve anonymity.   10
3.2. Experimental settings and general procedures 
The experiment was conducted in a UFV Department of Agricultural Economics 
classroom. Due to scheduling issues and limited space in the classroom, the experiment 
was performed in six separated experimental sections. In each section, participants were 
told (and this was actually the case) that 172 people had answered our call and were 
scheduled for taking part in the experiment. It was anticipated that, owing to normal 
absences, we could expect about 120 to 140 subjects effectively participating, and thus 
making decisions that would impact the provision of the “public good.” While 
discussion between the participants was not allowed during the experimental sections, 
post-experiment communication among acquainted participants could not be avoided. 
Both the very nature of provision dilemma and the large number of participants rule out 
the concern that cooperation could result from uncontrolled post experiment 
communication. 
 
3.3. The assessment tool 
The assessment tool consisted of a survey taken using forty multiple choice 
questions in a Most Like Me / Least Like Me format (Values Profile). This tool was 




reference to his/her overall lifestyle and not to any compartmentalized area of life, such 
as profession or religious belief. Although a personality is thought to be formed by a 
mix of different value systems, Hurlbut’s test is designed to reveal a person’s dominant 
value system, then secondary value system, and so on.  
                                                 
3 The 1
st and the 8
th stages are not covered by the assessment tool. The behavioral systems associated with 
the 1
st level are conjectured to hold for approximately 0.1 percent of the world adult population (Beck & 
Linscott,  1991;  Wilber,  2001),  and  is  present  in  senile  elderly,  late  stage  Alzheimer’s  patients,  the 
mentally ill and the starving. The 8
th level is thought to be relatively rare and represents the “leading 
edge” of collective human evolution. Some 8
th level’s intellectual products include Teilhard de Chardin’s 
concept of noosphere, the growth of transpersonal psychology, chaos and complexity theories, integral-
holistic systems thinking, and Gandhi’s and Mandela’s pluralist integration (Beck & Cowan (1996).   11
Table 2 lists the six selected value systems and illustrates a statement 
representative of each system given in response to one of the survey questions. 
 
Table 2. Statements representative of each stage of psychosocial development, 
from survey question responses. 




























(communion)  Animistic  a magical place alive with spirit beings and mystical signs 
Source: Adapted from Beck (1999) 
 
Hurlbut’s test is assumed to be valid only for speakers of standard American 
English and persons with the equivalent of a high school education. Due to necessity, 
and under the consent by the National Values Center (NVC) Inc., we employed a 
Portuguese translation of Hurlbut’s test to examine Graves’s claim that the 
biopsychosocial concept is cross-culturally valid (Graves, 2005, p. 4). 
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3.4. Factor Analysis: pretest of the cross-cultural robustness of Graves’s constructs 
The burden of proof of a theory that grounds a concept of human valuation in 
anything more general than the “settled convictions” of a culture is enormous. In this 
regard, the main contribution of our experimental work is to test a series of theoretical 
expectations derived from Graves’s constructs vis-à-vis participants’ behavior under 
different experimental conditions. The wave-like, flowing phenomenon underlying 
Graves’s concept of interior growth means that his stages or “levels of existence” impart 
only nodal positions, or “centers of psychosocial gravity,” not the total systemic 
manifestation of concrete individuals. However, these nodal positions must follow an 
invariant sequence so that the interweaving of value systems does not occur at random 
but follows a certain logic of mutual evaluative perspectives. We claim that if the factor 
analysis generates theoretically meaningful components from a nonarbitrary pattern of 
correlations between the Most Like Me / Least Like Me survey variables produced in our 
sample of Brazilian participants, this result is a sign of the cross-cultural robustness of 
Graves’s general scheme. 
 
 
3.5. Public-goods (PGG) provision dilemma 
3.5.1. Experiment summary 
This experiment was a step-level give-some dilemma based on Poppe and 
Zwikker (1996). Everyone gained if enough participants contributed. Discussion 
between participants was not allowed during the experiment. The experiment was made 
up of 127 subjects (62 female, 65 male).
4 
The experiment consisted of nine trials. In each trial, every participant had 
R$0.50 (US$0.25) at his disposal. The participants were asked to decide whether they 
                                                 
4 There was missing case regarding the Values Profile, leaving only 126 statistical tested cases. 
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would keep the R$0.50 or would contribute them to a common pool. If at least X 
percent of the participants contributed to the pool, all participants would receive 
R$1.00. If a participant contributed but not enough others contributed, the participant 
would lose the contribution. In each trial, the participant could get R$0.00 (contributed 
but not enough others contributed), R$0.50 (did not contribute & not enough others 
contributed), R$1.00 (contributed & enough others contributed), or R$1.50 (did not 
contribute but enough others contributed).  
The percentage (X) of total participants who had to contribute in order for all to 
receive the R$1.00 bonus varied in the nine trials. Sequentially by trial the percentages 
were 40%, 70%, 10%, 60%, 90%, 30%, 50%, 80% and 20%.  Before every trial, each 
participant was asked to indicate what percentage of all participants he/she expected to 
contribute. To insure that the participants give their best-guess estimates, the participant 
with the most accurate estimate at the end of each trial received a R$5 bonus.  
The motives underlying a participant’s decision to contribute or not were 
determined by comparing the participant’s expectations with their actual decisions. If 
the participant did not contribute, the motive could be greed or fear (of losing R$0.50), 
depending on whether the participant expected that there would be enough contributions 
for the provision of the public good. Similarly, if the participant did contribute, the 
motive could be either solidarity or a sense of duty (contributed though not believing 
enough would contribute). For each motive a dichotomous score reflected the presence 
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  Did the participant expect that enough 
participants will contribute? 
Yes  No 
Did the participant 
contribute? 
Yes  SOLIDARITY  DUTY 
No  GREED  FEAR 
 
  Are there enough  
contributions by others? 
Yes  No 
Did the participant 
contribute? 
Yes  1.00  0.00 





3.5.2. Theoretical expectations 
Insofar as the incentive structure creates the provision dilemma (Figure 1), the 
standard game-theoretic prediction suggests that the public good will not be supplied 
(dominant strategy--not contribute) irregardless of the level of contribution required. 
The theory makes no distinction between alternative motives and tacitly identifies the 
decision of not contributing with the rational choice. Other public-goods experiments 
have shown that the required level of contribution, the context, and the actual content of 
the decision affect participants’ behavior (Poppe, 2005; Kopelman et al, 2002; Kollock, 
1998; Komorita & Parks, 1995; Lepyard, 1995; Van Lange et al, 1992). Our study seeks 
to determine how participants’ decisions and motivations relate with Graves’s stages of 
psychosocial development and if interior growth brings forth an increased willingness to 
cooperate for the provision of public goods.  
In regards to the average frequency of contributions over the nine trials we posit,  
PGG_contributions: individuals centered in both the 3
rd and 5
th stages of 
psychosocial development (Table 1) are expected to contribute less frequently, 
while those centered in the sacrifice-self systems (2
nd, 4
th, and 6
th stages) and in 
the 7
th stage are expected to contribute more frequently. 
Figure 1. Public good experiment: motives and final outcomes.   15
As for the motivations underlying each of the possible decisions, we posit, 




stages would cooperate out of both solidarity and sense of duty. Individuals 
centered in the 5
th and 7
th stages would cooperate out of solidarity but not from a 
sense of duty; while those in the 3
rd stage are not ever expected not to cooperate. 




th or the 7
th stages decide not to cooperate, the underlying motive 
should be fear but not greed. The motives underlying the refusal to cooperate on 
the part of individuals centered in either the 3
rd or 5
th stages of psychosocial 
development may be either fear or greed.   
 
4. Results 
4.1. Factor analysis suggests that Graves’s scheme is cross-culturally robust 
Table 3 presents the component matrix from factor analysis applied to the 
survey data. The moderate communalities indicate that survey scores are considerably 
scattered along the tridimensional space defined by the principal axes. Such dispersion 
reflects the natural overlapping and interwavering of the different psychosocial 
perspectives, as discussed earlier. What matters most is that the correlation pattern in 
the component matrix reveals three theoretically sound principal nodal waves of 
existence: the egocentric wave (Factor 1, Table 3), best represented by 3
rd stage 
thinking; the absolutist wave (Factor 2), best represented by 4
th stage thinking; and the 
sociocentric wave (Factor 3), as best represented by 6
th stage thinking. Taken together, 
these three components explain about 70% of the sample’s total variance (Factor 1 = 
23.44%; Factor 2 = 22.15%; and Factor 3 = 24.56%, after Varimax rotation
5).  
We believe that the theoretical meaningfulness of these principal nodal waves of 
existence is an indication of the cross-cultural robustness of Graves’s constructs. If this 
                                                 
5 It should be mentioned that when the Varimax rotation is done, the maximum variance property of the 
original components is destroyed. The rotation essentially reallocates the factor loadings and, thus, the 
first rotated factor will no longer necessarily account for the maximum amount of variance. 
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were not the case, there would be no reason to expect theoretically sound mutual 
evaluations involving these constructs in a sample of Brazilian participants assessed 
nearly three decades after their design in the United States. Our claim is supported by 
associations between the factor scores and the behavior produced under our study’s 
experimental conditions, which will be discussed in the following paragraphs.  
 
Table 3 





Rescaled Component (Factor) 
1  2  3 
2
nd_most  .466    .369    .476    .335 
2
nd_least  .592    .002   -.464   -.614 
3
rd_most  .538    .722    .072   -.109 
3
rd_least  .851   -.897    .124    .176 
4
th_most  .733   -.346    .783   -.007 
4
th_least  .733    .727   -.453    .020 
5
th_most  .696    .092   -.052   -.827 
5
th_least  .532   -.069   -.246    .683 
6
th_most  .788   -.423   -.069    .774 
6
th_least  .518    .569    .256   -.359 
7
th_most  .766    .109   -.850   -.176 
7
th_least  .521    .215    .682    .104 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
The correlations in bold are all statistically significant 
a. Rotation converged in 7 interactions. 
Source: Research results 
 
 
We will skip comments on the 2
nd stage of psychosocial development, which 
was plausibly shown to be less useful for distinguishing the nodal positions present in a 
sample of undergraduate and graduate students. Factor 1 (egocentric wave) is best 
represented by the statements, values, and worldview associated with the 3
rd stage 
(Table 1) and least represented by both the 4
th and 6
th stages, as demonstrated by data   17
shown in Table 3: positive correlations with 3
th_most and negative correlations with 
3
th_least; positive correlations with 4
th_least and 6
th_least and negative correlations with 
4
th_most and 6
th_most. On the other hand, Factor 2, (absolutist wave) is best represented 
by the statements and authoritarian view linked with the 4
th stage (Table 1) and is 
expected to be strongly rejected by the 7
th stage worldview (Table 3). Factor 3 
(sociocentric wave) is best represented by statements associated with the 6
th stage and 
strongly distanced from positions linked with the 5
th stage, as expected. We have 
skipped comments on the 2
nd stage; which was plausibly shown to be less useful for 
distinguishing the nodal positions present in our sample. 
 
4.2. PGG experiment 
4.2.1. Different conditions, different decisions and motives: institutions clearly matter  
Table 4 presents data from the PGG experiment grouped into three broad levels 
of contribution: low, medium, and high. These data includes the distribution of revealed 
expectations, actual decisions made, and the motives underlying those decisions. 
Although the level of needed contribution caused great variation in expectations and 
actual contribution, data show that an average of 51.4% of the participants expected 
enough other participants would contribute and an average of only 26.2% actually 
contributed. Given this general lack of contribution, the experiment participants 
received the public good in only three of the nine PGG trials, those which required less 
than 40% participation.  In the trials, 28.6% of the participants showed greed, 45.1% 
fear, 22.8% solidarity, and 3.4% a sense of duty.  
Following Poppe (2005), we performed a series of ANOVA tests with the 
contribution level as the within-subject factor.  If an ANOVA test showed a significant 
effect from the contribution level, a linear trend analysis was performed. It was found   18
that the contribution level had significant effect on participant expectations, decisions, 
and underlying motivations. Reasonably, as the percentage of contributors needed rose, 
the number of contributors fell as did their expectations as to the number of others that 
would contribute (Table 5). Participants showed more fear and sense of duty and less 
greed and solidarity as the required percentage of contributors rose. These observations 
make perfect sense in terms of average behavior. We will now explore behavioral 
variability as the incentive structure changes to determine if stages of psychosocial 





Percentage of participants who did (not) expect enough others to contribute, did (not) 
contribute themselves, and their motivation: fear, greed, solidarity, or duty 
 
Participant expected that enough participants contributed 
No    Yes    Both 
                 
    Fear      Greed       
Participant did not contribute  Low  12.6    Low  57.0    Low  69.6 
  Medium  40.9    Medium  23.4    Médium  64.3 
  High  81.9    High  5.5    High  87.4 
  All  45.1    All  28.6    All  73.8 
                 
    Duty      Solidarity       
Participant contributed  Low  1.0    Low  29.4    Low  30.4 
  Medium  3.4    Medium  32.3    Médium  35.7 
  High  5.8    High  6.8    High  12.6 
  All  3.4    All  22.8    All  26.2 
                 
Both  Low  13.6    Low  86.4       
  Medium  44.4    Medium  55.6       
  High  87.7    High  12.3       
  All  48.6    All  51.4       
                 
 
Note: Low, Medium, High: trials in which a low (10%–30%), medium (40%–60%) or high 
(70%–90%) percentage of the participants had to contribute to obtain R$1.00. All: all trials. 
Source: Research results. 
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Table 5 




df1  df2 
Parameter estimates 
Sig.  R 
Square  F  Constant  B  Std. Beta 
                 
Expectation  0.390  729.149  1  1141  1.119  -0.012  -0.624  0.000 
Contribution  0.027  31.553  1  1141  0.402  -0.003  -0.164  0.000 
Fear  0.343  595.425  1  1141  -0.113  0.011  0.586  0.000 
Greed  0.235  351.131  1  1141  0.711  -0.008  -0.485  0.000 
Duty  0.013  14.985  1  1141  -0.006  0.001  0.114  0.000 
Solidarity  0.049  58.688  1  1141  0.408  -0.004  -0.221  0.000 
                 
Source: Research results. 
 
 
4.2.2. Same conditions, different decisions and motives: interior growth matters as well 
Results from multivariate regression analysis using the three principal factors as 
predictors (Table 6) suggest that contribution to provide th public good is supported 
mainly by individuals scoring higher in the sociocentric wave (Factor 3). This result 
concurs with the 5
th and 6
th stage tendencies noted in tables 1 and 3, the Factor 3 figures 




Linear  multivariate  regression  dependent  variable:  participant  contributed  to  the 
common pool (total of the nine trails) 
Model   
Unstandardized 
coefficients    Standardized 
coefficients  t  Sig. 
B  Std. error    Beta 
               
1  (Constant)  .263  .020      13.225  .000 
  Egocentric  -.029  .022    -.119  -1.349  .180 
  Absolutistic  .008  .021    .033  .378  .706 
  Sociocentric  .048  .020    .213  2.405  .018 
               
Source: Research results 
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The results in tables 7 and 8 relate to the underlying motives for decisions made 
by individuals centered at different psychosocial development stages in the PPG 
experiment and are broadly in agreement with theoretical expectations. The results show 
that greed as a motive for not contributing correlates positively with acceptance of the 
3
rd and 5
th stage attitudes and negatively with rejection of these attitudes, as suggested in 
the PGG_motivations to not contribute hypothesis. The motive greed is negatively 
correlated with Factor 3 (sociocentrism). The significant negative correlation between 
fear and acceptance of the 6
th stage attitude was not predicted. 
 
Table 7 
Pearson bivariate correlations: motives and payoff (n = 126) 
Survey variables  
and Factors 
Motive of decision 
Total payoff 
"Fear"  "Greed"  "Duty"  "Solidarity" 
2
nd_most  -0.009  -0.058  0.125*  0.012  -0.047 
2
nd_least  -0.079  0.209***  -0.051  -0.078  0.073 
3
rd_most  -0.065  0.139*  0.063  -0.078  0.023 
3
rd_least  0.002  -0.142*  -0.027  0.139*  -0.119* 
4
th_most  0.094  -0.111  -0.015  -0.001  -0.011 
4
th_least  0.065  0.103  -0.062  -0.144*  0.169** 
5
th_most  0.011  0.176**  -0.171**  -0.102  0.163** 
5
th_least  -0.030  -0.197**  0.218***  0.124*  -0.192** 
6
th_most  -0.151**  -0.105  0.169**  0.202**  -0.230*** 
6
th_least  -0.041  0.087  -0.023  -0.022  0.035 
7
th_most  0.112  0.006  -0.097  -0.095  0.122* 
7
th_least  0.111  -0.053  -0.042  -0.063  0.076 
Egocentric  0.027  0.094  0.034  -0.132*  0.114 
Absolutistic  0.030  -0.060  0.023  0.010  -0.025 
Sociocentric  -0.062  -0.173**  0.205**  0.145*  -0.194** 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (1-tailed). 
Source: Research results 
 
 
In regards to the decision to contribute, the motives solidarity and duty correlate 
positively with higher scores in Factor 3 and with acceptance of the 6
th stage attitude, 
supporting our PGG_motivations to contribute hypothesis. Duty correlates negatively 
with acceptance of positions linked with the 5
th stage (and positively with its rejection),   21
and solidarity correlates negatively with scores in Factor 1 (egocentrism). The positive 
correlation between duty and rejection of the 3
rd stage attitude and the negative 
correlation between duty and rejection of the 4
th stage attitude also support the 
PGG_motivations to contribute hypothesis. 
No statistically significant coefficients were found in multiple regressions or 
multinomial logistic models where the three principal factors were able to predict 
motives; yet, by using the frequency of the motives’ appearance as predictors of the 
factor scores, we were able to confirm the relationships between the four different 
motives and Factor 3. These results are presented in Table 8. Due to multicollinearity, 
each multinomial model excludes one motive. The models confirm that  solidarity and 
duty are positively associated with factor scores in sociocentrism (Model 1) and that 





Linear multivariate regression dependent variable: sociocentrism (all trials) 
Motive 
Sociocentrism (Factor 3) 
Model 1  Model 2 
Solidarity  
Std. Beta  0.206   -0,369  
sig.  0.065   0,130  
Duty  
Std. Beta  0.243   ---  
sig.  0.014   ---  
Fear  
Std. Beta  0.167   -0,505  
sig.  0.169   0,041  
Greed   Std. Beta  ---   -0,529  
sig.  ---   0,014  
(Constant)  
Std. Beta  -0,648   2,298  
sig.  0,075   0,034  
F   3,036   3,036  
sig.   0,032   0,032  
R
2   0,069   0,069  
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5. Conclusion and implications 
There is increasing recognition among institutional and behavioral economists of 
the limits of economic theory’s standard model of the individual and a growing 
consensus that a number of structural and contextual variables enhance the likelihood of 
self-organization in collective-action settings. As Henrich et al (2004) put it, empirical 
challenge to the selfishness axiom have fostered a number of reformulations of 
individual utility functions and other behavioral foundations consistent with the 
evidence from across a variety of experimental settings (Fehr & Schmidt 1999, Falk & 
Fishbacher 1998, Charness & Rabin 1999) as well as attempts to explain the long term 
evolutionary success of non-selfish behaviors (Simon 1990, Caporael et al 1989, 
Henrich & Boyd 2000, Boyd et al. 2001, Sober & Wilson 1994, Smith et al. 2001). 
However, the lack of a theory of human valuation that explains how individuals reach 
diverse utility judgments when faced with similar incentive structures hinders the 
advancement of a more comprehensive theory of how incentives affect individuals 
when confronted by a social dilemma. The theoretical advancement in this field is 
particularly challenged due to the moral aspect of choice situations wherein the 
individual and collective interests collide. 
We suggested that the paradigm of developmental structuralism offers a series of 
empirically grounded theories and models that adequately address the development of 
socio-cognitive, moral reasoning, which are of real significance for addressing morally 
relevant conflicts of action, as most social dilemmas. Our results point towards the 
worthiness of Graves’s model as one that could be used to predict the diverse behavioral 
responses to incentive structures created to resolve social dilemmas. Graves’s constructs 
were shown to be practical tools that simplified the interpretation of heterogeneous 
behavior exhibited by participants in different collective-action dilemmas under varied   23
institutional conditions; yet, further testing is needed to determine the range of this 
psychosocial model’s predictive ability. 
The policy implications linked with the developmental point of view ensues 
from both the structural features involved and the qualitative changes brought about 
along the developmental path. On one hand, the holarchical assembly of Graves’s stages 
means that an individual’s interior perspectives emerge in an order that cannot be 
altered by external conditioning or social reinforcement, as the process of consciousness 
awakening follows its own internal laws of transformation and is not simply imported 
from the external world. On the other hand, there is a great consistence among 
alternative developmental models in their description of the awakening process as a 
continuous decline in egocentrism, an increase in autonomy, and an increase in moral 
embrace. If one takes these features seriously when analyzing and recommending 
institutions intended to overcome social dilemmas, one cannot avoid the conclusion 
reached by Graves (2005, p. 482-3) that the prime goal of institutional designers should 
be to devise institutions designed first and foremost to promote human movement up the 
spiral of unfolding consciousness. 
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